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Abstract
The world is in the early stages of what will be the greatest health
cnsls in modem times. Millions of people-most of them in the
world's poor countries-are infected with HIV. The vast majority of
these people will suffer and die from AIDS. The extent of this
problem presents profound moral and ethical questions for the
world's wealthy people and countries, for it is they who are most
able to assist the poor in addressing this tragedy. Wh at is more , the
spread of HIV and AIDS poses m句 or threats to the interests of the
developed countries. In short, HIV/AIDS presents the world with
some of the most profound moral and practical challenges it has ever
faced during peacetime. Nevertheless , developed countries have
been very slow in responding to the international dimensions of this
problem. They have instead focused on the relatively few people
within their own borders at risk for HIV or suffering from AIDS ,
seemingly unwilling to recognize the greater challenges posed by the
global spread of f宜 V. The rhetoric has started to change, but the
developed countries have not backed this rhetoric with the
substantial new and additional funds to assist the poor countries in
coping with and reversing the HIV/AIDS epidemic. This essay
examines this moral and practical problem in the context of NorthSouth relations. lt serves to high Ii ght the need for much more
international assistance to combat HIV/AIDS in the developing
world

1. Introduction
The world is in the early stages of what will be the greatest health
crisis since the advent of modern medical technologies. Millions of
people-particularly people in many of the world's poor countriesare infected with HIV. The vast majority of these people wiU go
I Thc authors wish to thank thc intcmational joint rcscarch programme of thc Centre for
Public Policy , Lingnan Univcrsity , for assistance in facilitating rcscarch for this essay

without modem medical intervention or substantial treatment ,
Ieading rapidly to AIDS . The extent of this problem presents
profound moral and ethical questions for the wo r1 d's wealthy people
and countries , for it is they who are most able to assist the poor in
managing and reversing this human tragedy. Wh at is more , the
spread of HIV and AIDS poses m 句 or threats to the national interests
of the world's economically developed countries. In short ,
HIV/AIDS presents the wo r1 d with much more than a seemingly
insurmountable crisis in health; it also presents it with some of the
most profound moral and practical chaIIenges it has ever faced
during peacetime
Over the last century or more , there has been a gradual shi 丘 m
global attitudes toward interstate obligation. Govemments have
come to regard many forms of intemational assistance as obligatory
For example , when famine strikes , it is generally recognized that the
developed countries have an obligation to respond because they have
a surplus of food and the means to deliver it to those who are
starving. The degree to which this obligation is fulfilled varies , of
course , but few now argue that no such obligation exists . Similar
obligations arise in other issue areas , for example with regard to
natural disasters and adverse environmental changes , and
governments of the rich countries (and indeed many of their private
citizens and nongovernmental groups) respond accordingly with
increasing frequency , robustness , and speed. HIV/AIDS presents the
wo r1 d with such a problem requiring assistance from the wo r1 d's
wealthy.
Nevertheless , developed countries have been very slow in
responding to the international dimensions of the HIV/AIDS
problem. They have instead focused on the relatively few people
within their own borders at risk for HIV or sllffering from AIDS ,
seemingly unwilling to recognize the greater challenges posed by the
global spread of HIV. The rhetoric has started to change一-the United
States , for example , has identified this problem as a potential threat
to U.S. national interests and has pledged some funds in recent
2
years -but the developed cOllntries have not backed this rhetoric
with substantial new and additional funds to assist the poor countries
in coping with and reversing the HIV/AIDS epidemic. That is , while
accepting a responsibility to respond to other crises that are
1t is not at all clear whether these funds will bc new and additional or , as s巴巴 ms more likely,
mostl y taken from other assistance programs
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insllrmountable by those countries experiencing them , the developed
wo r1 d has done relatively little to help the poor cOllntries address the
problem of Hl V/AIDS. This not only runs counter to established
obligations betwe巳n North and South, but defies many commonly
accepted moral principles crying out for greater intemational
distributive justice, contributes to tremendolls human suffering , and
harms the national interests of poor and rich countries alike
ThllS , the developed countries ought to act much more robustly
to assist the poor countries of the world in their fight agaínst AIDS
because doing so would comply with now accepted standards of
intemational obligation , promote many ethical principles shared by
civilized peoples , and promote the national interests of those aided
αnd (i mportantly, from a political perspective) those providing the
aid
ln this essay we address these issues. The next section of the
essay looks more c1 0sely at the HIV/AIDS problem for the
developing world. Explicit in this discussion is the c1 ear need and
demand for aid from the world's wealthy countries to address the
problem , and implicit is the moral obligation of the wo r1 d's wealthy
to aid the world's poor in doing so. The third section examines the
historical evolution of developed countries' obligations of
intemational distributive justice toward the wo r1 d's poor countries
We argue that such obligation has increased over tim己， and suggest
that it ought to continue in the context of HIV/AIDS. ln the fourth
section of the essay we undertake an analysis of the HIV/AIDS in
light of historical obligations between the wo r1 d's rich and poor,
bearíng in mind the very important prudential reasons for actualizing
intemational distributive justice in this contex t. We conclude with
some thoughts on this difficult topic
2. HIV/AIDS: A Problem Demanding Global Justice
It is hard to overstate the dimensions of the problem of 1-宜 V/AIDS in
the developing world , particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. World
wide , AIDS has already killed more than 22 million people and left
more than 13 million children orphaned , according to the Joint
United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS , more commonly referred to
as UNAIDS. 3 Approximately 36 million people are cu汀ently

3

UNA lD S, "Report on the Global H1 V/A lD S Epidcmic ," 2000 , availablc at <h口p :l.八叭\"\Y

unaids . orglepid巴mic _ update/repo rt/ Epi_rcpor t. pd f>

infected with HIV, and an average of 16 ,000 new infections is
believed to occur daily.4
In looking at the demographics of H1V infection , much
emphasis has been placed (appropriately) on geography. Although
comprising only about 10% of the world's population, sub-Saharan
Africa has bome a hugely disproportionate share of the wo rI d's
HIV/AIDS epidemic. Approximately 70% of the world's HIVpositive adults and 80% of the world's HIV -positive children live in
this region and the adult prevalence rate of HIV is eight times that of
the rest of the world (8.8% compared to the 1.1 % average world
wide).5 And the situation is not improving. Ofthe world's estimated
5.3 million new infections in 2000 , 3.8 million , or 71 %, occu叮ed in
sub-Saharan Africa , compared , for example, to the 45 ,000 new
infections (I ess than 1% of the world-wide new infections) in North
America. 6 Other developing and transition states also have huge
numbers of infected individuals. As UN Secretary General Kofi
Anan pointed 0肘， India will soon have the highest number of 1召V
positive people of any country in the world, and by 2005 China and
India together a~e expected to have more than 10 million HIVpos 1Í lve cltlzens.'
Although geography is a tremendously important way of
viewing the world's AIDS pandemic , an equaIly important, and
complementary, vantage is provided through the lens of poverty. A
stunning 95 percent of the world's HIV-positive people /i ve in lowincome countries. o In fact , poverty is currently the single most
powerfuI risk factor in deterrnining who among the world's people
are most vulnerable to HIV. It is also therefore not surprising that
Africa, with its average GDP of $560 per person , compared to Asia's
meager $730 and Latin America's $4 ,230 , has suffered so
disproportionately (though these numbers also add urgency to the
warnings that Asia is seriously at risk as well). \0
'.1

Individllal Mcmbcrs of the Fac lI lty of Harvard Univcrsity , "Conscnsus S t..'l tement on
Antirctroviral Trcatmcnt for A lD S in Poor Countrics ," 4 April 2001 , p. 3
5 UNAIDS , "Rcport on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic."
6 UNAIDS , "Rcport on the Global HIV/A1 DS Epidemic."
7 Secretary General Kofi Anar丸 "Remarks to the United States Chamber of Commerce ,"
Washington , DC , 1 June 2001
8 lndividual Members ofthc Facu!ty ofHarvard University , p. 3
9 Gcrald Stine , AIDS Update 2000 (Upper Saddle Rivcr , NJ: Prentic巴 Hall ， 2000) , p. 11
10 Thcsc figurcs are takcn from thc web pagc of USAID , "USAID CP FY2000: AFR Regiona!
Repo口" availablc at < http://\叭叭v. usaid.gov/pubs/cp2000/afr/afr_ovcr.htm!>
4
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The combination of poverty and HIV creates a terrible
downward spiral in poor cOllntries whereby poverty provides many
of the conditions that facilitate the spread of HIV. Poverty leads to
poor health conditions generally , including the lack of treatment of
conditions , such as sexually transmitted diseases , that make
individuals more susceptible to HIV infection. Poverty also creates
exploitative working conditions that have been shown to foster the
spread of HIV infection both in women-who are forced through the
lack of other economic opportunities into formal and informal
prostitution-and men-who leave their families to find work
thereby incurring increased docllmented risks generally through
factors inherent in migratory work and specifically through trades
in c1 uding trucking and mining. 11
As ilI ness and death due to HIV infection spread through
communities , poverty creates a situation where every aspect of the
disease一-from treatment of the ill to the creation of orphans through
the death of parents and guardians to the challenges of implementing
prevention programs-create strains on already overtaxed social
systems. When people become sick , families are forced to spend
precious resources on any treatment options they can find. Sickness
in adult family members means they cannot eam an income, grow or
provide food , or care for their children. The eventuaI death of adults
Ieaves children , many of whom have already been pulled from
school because of the inability to pay schooI fees , with no one to
care for them. They, and adult women survivors , may be forced into
sex work to provide for themselves and their families , thereby
multiplying not only their own suffering, but also the transmission of
HIV. 口

The devastation experienced within and among families is
mirrored in the communities within which they live. In poor
countries that already suffer from a lack of forma lI y educated
professionaIs in education , health care , the military, and the
government bureaucracy, AIDS has been devastating. For instance ,
11 An exccllent and more e:-.:tcnsivc discussion of these interactions of povc口:y and HIV can bc
found in Brook K. Bakcr, "South African AIDS : lmpacts of G1obalization , Pharrnaceutical
Aparthcid , and Lcgal Activism ," 3 April 2001 , pp. 4-7 , available at <http://
globaltrcatmcntacccss .org>
12 An exccl1ent snapshot of thc tragic situations crcatcd by HIV in sub-Saharan Africa is
providcd in a Publitzer prize-winning scries by Mark Schoofs , "AIDS : The Agony of Afric丸"
Parts 1 心 ， Villagc Voi白 ， 9 Novcmbcr 1999-4 January 2000. Availab Jc at <http ://W\叭V
vi l1agcvoice.comlissucs/9952 . schoofs .html>

5

it has been estimated that a country with an HIV prevalence rate of
30% \V ould Iose between 3 and 7 percent of its health care workers
annually to A1DS. 13 The ranks of teachers are simila r1 y being
depleted. 1n Zambia, in one year (1 998) 1,300 teachers died-two
thirds of the amount that are trained annually.14 UNAIDS Director
Peter Piot has commented that "H1V does to society what it does to
the human body. It undermines the very institutions that are meant
to defend society-its doctors , its teachers . 15
A further aggravating factor to the pove吐y of the world's
poorer countries is the staggering extemal debt they owe to wea 1thier
countries and to the Wo r1 d Ban k. Again , sub-Saharan Africa serves
as a striking , though by no means isolated example. According to a
repo 吐 by the debt relief NGO Jubilee 2000 , sub-Saharan Africa
owes $231 billion to its creditors , which breaks down to $406 per
African. Foreign aid cannot keep pace with the deb t: for every
dollar received in foreign aid in 1999 , the region paid back $1. 51 in
deb t. And the opportunity cost of this debt servicing is equa lI y great
Sub-Saharan Africa spends twice as much on debt servicing as it
does on health care. 1G
The relationship of the developed wo r1 d to the devastating
pove吋y and aggravating circumstances of the developing world is
complex. At the very least , we may easily argue that the developed
world has stood in the way of the developing world's efforts to soIve
A1DS and other health-related problems in the most cost-effective
\V ays possible. The developed \V orld has , for example , repeatedly
taken positions elevating patent protections (sometimes at levels
even stronger than those prescribed by intemational treaties) above
public hea 1th in developing countries. Brazil , South Africa and
Thailand are among the countries that have been overtly pressured
by the United States government not to take measures to bolster their
abilities to obtain or produce cheaper generic dmgs or even , in the
,,

D \V orld Bank , "Difficult Hcalth Policy Choiccs in a Scvcrc AIDS Epidcmic ," in Conjronting
AIDS: F /l blic Friorities in σ G/ob σ / Epidemic (\Vashington DC : \V orld Bank, 1997) avaibble
at <http ﹒//\叭叭v . worldba叫<.org/aids-econ/arv/conf-aids -4/ch4-1 p2 .htm#T2>
14 Norimitsu Onishi , "AIDS Cuts Swath Through Africa's Teachers ," New York Times , 14
August 2000
的 Peter Piot, UNAIDS Press Re\ ease , 7 May 2000
16 A I1 of these figures are taken from JlI bil ee 2000 Coalitior丸 "Eïe of the Needle: African
Debt Report ," No\'cmbcr 2000 availabl e at <http ://w \V w .j ubilec2000 1l k.orglrcports/
nccdlc.html >
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case of Thailand , to monitor drug prices. 17 Various other
intemational leaders have also publi c\ y and privately shown their
support for patent regimes , regardless of the devastating effect they
may have for people unable to afford the prices set by the branded
(as opposed to generic) pharmaceutical industry. In the case of
South Africa , for example, although the United States took a more
vocal position in opposing the 1997 amendment to the Medicines
and Related Substances Control Act that would make it easier to
purchase affordable drugs , European countries als.~ exerted pressure
on behalf of the branded pharmaceutical industry.10
Some would argue that the relationship goes deeper, and that
the world's wealthy countries' culpability goes even furthe r.
According to this line of argument it is the neo-liberal policies of the
world's richest countries that are at least partially responsible for the
problems of the world's poorest countries. These policies in c\ ude
the maintenance of exploitative colonial pattems of ownership; the
destructive re-orientation of economies to produce low-cost exports
at the expense of the environment and human and labor rights;
liberalizing currency exchanges and financial markets resulting in
currency devaluations , market volatility and out f1 ow of capital; and
the imposition of harmful structural adjustment programs that are
disproportionately borne by the poorest in society.19 Taken together ,
these policies may be responsible for , and almost certainly at least
contribute to , the inability of developing countries to solve their 0 \Vl1
economic and social problems
叫fhatever level of culpability one assigns to the developed
countries , it is clear that the developing countries wi l1 need outside
resources to help solve the growing AIDS crises they face. There
have been a number of promising recent developments. Uganda ,
Senegal and Thailand have been held up as international examples of
countries that have successfully lowered or held low transmission
rates , and in April 2001 , African leaders held a summit in Abuja ,
Nigeria , where they pledged to spend a significant proportion of

17

Scc , for cxample Tina Roscnburg , "Look at Brazil ," New

Y，ο rk Times Magazine , 28

January

2001

Sce Europcan Union Ambassador Erwon Fou 巳r巴's letter to Dr. O. Shisana" 24 Novcmber
1997 available at <h位p :l/\\"\\"\\".cptech.org/ip/hcalth/eu. fourc.html>
19 AII of thesc conditions (and scveral morc) are d巳vcloped in thc context ofthe casc of South
Africa in Bake丸 "South African AIDS."
1X
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their nationaI budgets on AIDS. Yet , it is impo口ant to remember
that these budgets themselves are tiny compared to those of
developed countries . And even in Uganda , where infection rates
have been cut in half over ten years-an extremely impressive
achievement-they stilI remain at Ieast ten times higher than world21
wide average prevalence rates . PoliticaI commitment on the part of
developing countries is clearly a necessary but not sufficient
condition for ending the AIDS pandemic in the developing world
20

3. A History of Intcrnational Obligation:
When Need Arises , the Wealthy Ought to Act
Obligations between rich and poor within societies , particula r! y
wealthy ones , have been established and institutionalized over the
last centurγor more . Social welfare systems , whereby resources are
redistributed from the more affluent in society to those who are poor,
are now commonplace in almost alI economicalIy developed
societies . In recent decades一-especialI y since the mid-twentieth
century-these obligations have extended to international relations.
The wo rI d's wealthy countries now give substantial amounts of
money to the poorer countries , often for self-interested reasons , but
22
also because it is now viewed as the right thing to dO.
International Obligation and Distributive Justice
There are many philosophical-ethical arguments for the rich
countries of the world to adopt a greater obligation toward the
wo r! d's poor, and specificalIy for them to provide emergency
assistance , development aid , and additional money and technology
to help them deal with many problems they face . These arguments
fall under the nlbric of intemational distributive justice, fairness and
equity. Among these conceptions , at least six are germane and usefuI
in helping us better think about obligations between countries ,

For one account of the Abuja summit sce John Donnell y, "Leaders Vow to Combat Africa
AIDS Epidemic ," Boston Globe , 29 April 200 I
~ I For a description of Uganda's success , see Alex Duval Smith , "Faith , Hope and Charity,"
The Independent (London) , 2 December 2000.
22 Scc , for examplc , David H . Lumsdaine， λ10ml 的sion in International Politics: The Foreign
Aid Regime. 1 夕 49-1989 (Princeton: Princeton University Press , 1993); Alain Noel and JeanPhilippe 1l1erien , "From Domcstic to Intemational Justice : 1l1e Welfare State and Foreign
Aid ," Internationdl Organization 49 , 3 (Summer 1995) , pp. 523-刃 ; and LO l1 is-Marie Imbea l1,
20

Donor Aiι Th e Determinants 01 Development Allocations. to Third World Countries: A
Comparntive Analysis (Nc叭. Y ork: Petcr Lang , 1989)

s

particularly between richer and poorer ones?3 These conceptions are
prcmiscd on rights , causality and responsibility , utilitarianism ,
Kantian ethics , Rawlsian justice, and impartialíty.24
From a human rights perspective , individuals have inherent
rights , such as mIn llTIUm nutrition , ' freedom from torture , and so
f。此h ， simply because they are human beings. Henry Shue argues
that individuals have at least the right to subsistence, for without it
no other rights can be exercised?5 HIV and of course AIDS , without
the treatments that are now far more expensive than the vast majority
of sufferers can afford , certainly deny people this most basic righ t. If
the developed countries care about the "basic" rights that Shue and
others argue for , they ought to be much more forthcoming with aid
and technology (i .e" pharmaceuticals and treatment strategies)
necessary for survival in this contex t.
Conceptions of international obligation , fairness and equity
based on causality or responsibility assert , simply, that those
responsible for causing harm are responsible for ending and
ultimately righting that wrong. According to Shue, "the obligation to
restore those whom one has hanned is acknowledged even by those
who reject any general obligation to help strangers. [T]his is because
one ought even more fundamentally to do no harm in the first
place." 2G To be sure , acquiring HIV is often the responsibility of
those who have 此 27 but even here the Northbears some
responsibility. Developed countries are not doing enough to finance
education campaigns and the promotion of women's rights , for
example , which could reduce the spread of HIV. More obviously,
they have some responsibility with regard to AIDS. There funding
for trcatmcnt is miniscule rclativc to thc scalc of thc problem and
Hcrc \\'c do not prctend to takc on thc burdcns of philosophical excg巳sis ， Mathew Patcrson
is one of thc scholars 叫10 has \\T ittcn on this topic in the em 'ironmcntal contex t. Sce Paterson ,
"Intcrmtioml Justice and Global Wanning ," in The Ethical Dimcnsions ofGlobal Change ， 巳d .
Barry Holdcn (London : Macmilbn Prcss , 1996) , pp. 181-20 1. For more about thcsc
conccptions of obligation and justicc , in thc context of global cnvironmental change , see Paul
G . Harris , lnternσ tlOnσ1 Eqllity and Glohal Enνiroll ll1 cntal Po /i tics (Aldershot: Ashgate Prcss ,
forthcoming 2001)
24 This typology mirrors Paterson's framewor k. Sce also , for example , Chris Brown ,
lnternational Reiatiolls Th eory (Oxford: Columbia Uni\叫sity Prcss , 1992)
25 Hcn門， Shuc , Basic Ri ghts (Princcton : Princctoll Univcrsity Prc品 ， 1996).
26 Hcnry Shuc , "Equity in an Intcrmtioml Agrccmcnt 011 Climatc Changc ," Eqllity and Social
Cο nsidcrations Related to Climate Change , eds 刊 chard Samson Odingo et al. (N airobi
ICIPE Scicnce Press , 1995) , p. 386
27 An d oftcn it is no t. Hcmophiliacs and pcrsons \\'ho havc bce n forced to havc unprotcct ed
scx arc among thosc 叫10 ar巴 cl ca rl y in no 叭 ay rcsponsible for thcir misfortune
23
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relative to their ability to help , and they are often obstacles to the
lowering of drug prices essential to widespread treatment and
prolongation of life for AIDS sufferers
Altematively, utilitarians might argue that global benefits and
burdens should be distributed in such a way as to achieve the
greatest good-or reduce the largest amount of suffering-for the
greatest number of individuals. 28 Thus , the almost total emphasis by
the rich countries of the world on I咀 V/AIDS among their own
citizens , while commendable as far as it goes , does not go nearly far
enough. The vast m句 ority of suffering is in the world's poor
countries; the utilitarian perspective would require that this suffering
be addressed in a much more concerted fashion. 29
From the Kantian perspective , people should be treated as ends
in themselves , and certainly not as means to one's own ends. 30 It is
unfair to exploit other people because they would not freely choose
to be exploited. Thus if the burdens of the free market global
economic system and intemational patent rules are imposed on
countries against their free will , those systems are not fair and
equitable. If the global trading system as it exists now and as it is
promoted by most of the world's developed countries exacerbates
conditions leading to suffering from AIDS , it is exploitative and
unJust
A Rawlsian conception of what is a fair and equitable
distribution of intemational burdens might derive from conceptions
of self-interest decided in an "original position" behind a "veil of
ignorance. 31 It is doubtful that the people of the weaIthy countries ,
let alone others , would choose the existing state of affairs regarding
HIV/AIDS if they were unsure where they wOllld be bom , into what
economic circllmstances , and with or withollt HIV/AIDS (i.e. ,
whether they would begin life as an "AIDS baby"). Also from a
,,

2g

C f. M. Wamock , ed. , Mill: Utilitarianism and Other Writing .l' (Gbsgow: Collins , 1962);,
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and H. L.A. Hart, (London: Athlone Press , 1970)
29 Of coursc , if one thinks that the wcll bcing and livcs ofpcoplc in thc rich countrics is vastly
more important-that is , if the utility cxpcrienccd by onc pcrson in , say , the United States is
greater than that of many people in , say , South Africa一this argument is not ve可 strong. We
dOllb t, and certainly hope , that many people would want to support this view ve可 strongly，
however , at least from an ethical perspective (as opposed to a political one)
30 Inunanuel Kant , The Moral Law (London: Hutchinson , 1948)
31 John Rawls , A Theory ofJustice (Cambridge , MA: Harvard Univcrsity Press , 1971). Rawls
argues that his theory does not apply much to intemational rclations . Ncvertheless , severaI
scho \a rs have arglled othcrwise , notably Charles Beitz, Political Th eory and Intcrnational
Re1，σtions (Princcton: Princcton University Press , 1979)
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Rawlsian-l ike perspective , ineqllalities in distriblltion are acceptable
insofar as they benefit the least advantaged in society, because that is
what those in the original position would choose. Hence, for
example, it is perfectly acceptable that phannaceutical companies
make profits (vvhich are , after all , an incentive to create the drugs
necessary for treating AIDS and its related maladies) , but not if this
comes on the back of the least advantaged in the world. This
suggests , to extend the example, that drug makers should not make
their large profits at the expense of the millions suffering from
HIV/AIDS in the developing world , and it further implies that
wealthy governments ought to at least do more to help those
sufferers pay for the drugs.
A final philosophical-ethical perspective (there many more) on
intemational obligation and distributive justice is premised on
llnpa吋 iality. 32 It requires that we assess what is fair based on what is
reasonable. It is not reasonable to expect an equal relationship
between the United States and , say, Nigeria (nor, which is apt in this
case, between Pfizer and South Africa). The United States should aid
the poorest countries to cope with HIV and AIDS , using the words
of Chris Brown in a different context，市 ot because it is in the United
States' interest to do so but because justice as impartiality suggests
that the case for such aid cannot be reasonably denied."
It seems to us that these arguments for greater North-South
obligation are persuasive, particular1 y when combined. That 芯， there
are many ethical arguments favoring greater action on 1宜V/AIDS in
poor countries by the wo r1 d's wealthy countries; the weight of moral
argument is rea lI y quite profound. This is especia lI y the case with
regard to callsality and responsibility. Thus , insofar as the developed
countries are complicit in suffering experienced in the developing
world , the obligation to act is much stronge r. If there is an accepted
obligation to help those suffering from adverse natural events
(earthquakes , famine) , it seems self evident that , where there is some
responsibility for harm , the obligation is even stronge r. Hence ,
insofar as the rich countries contribute to , say, global environmental
changes that harm others (see the discussion below) , they must act to
end that harm and provide comfort to those who have suffered from
it. Extending this argument , insofar as the developed
.J.J

32
33

8rian Barη\ ./usficc as I lI1parfia !i ty (Oxford : Oxford Uni vcrsity Prcss , 1995)
Brown, p. 18 1.
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we think , through its in f1 uence on the global economic system , for
exampJ e- it is obliged to provide aid to mitigate and hopefu l1 y end
that suffering.
Obligations of Intcrnntional Aid: A History of Evolving Norms
Past and contemporary international history provides us with
examples of greater acceptance by the world's wealthier countries of
obl igation to aid the \Vor1 d's poorer countries . There has been an
historical trend toward greater intemational obligation (j ustice ,
fairness , equity) in intemational law and international relations
between the world's rich and poor countries and peoples. The logic
of this obligation is quite simple: A problem requiring action arises
in which human beings are experiencing great suffering. The
problem is suftìciently immense that those suffering from it cannot
implement soIutions or mitigation measures without help. Solutions
to the problem or measures to mitigate the reslllting human suffering
exist , and those soIutions and measures-money, expertise ,
technology, etc.-are readily available in countries with the abi Ii ty
to supply them (most often the \VorI d's wea 1thy countries). Therefore ,
those with the ability to provide the necessary aid have an ob Ii gation
to administer 泣， even if they are not directly comp Ii cit in causing the
problem-but much more profoundly ifthey are
Before looking more directly at the situation with regard to
HIV/AIDS , here we look at three areas where international
obligation bεtween the wo rI d's rich and poor has grown . This
illustrates the contemporary international context of obligation and
aid .3-l We believe that the trend that is illllstrated is indicative of
what ought to happen in the case of HIV/AIDS . Indeed , there are
some indications that movement in this direction has started.
Disaster Reliej" Obligalion to Respond to Natura! Disaslers
Many of the world's people Iive in places that are prone to natural
disasters fro111 events ranging from hllrricanes and cycJones to
earthquakes and vo 1c anic emptions. These c1 isasters can be severe ,
leading to many lost lives , extensive damage to infrastnlcture
3~ Th ese are some of the major examples. Others can be fOllnd , sllch as the obligation to
provid e humanitarian relief-and at times to even intervene militaril y-in times of civic ,
ethnic and interstate con f1i ct. See , for exampl e, Thomas G . \Veiss and Cindy Collins ,
Hl l1 l1 an ilarian Challenges and Jnterven lion (Bolllder: \Vestvicw Press , 1996) and Michael J
Smith , "Humanitarian Int巴 rve ntion : An Ove rv ie叭， of the Eth ical Issucs ," in Jocl H . Roscnthal ,
cd . ， 的hics and 扣 ternσ tiona! A伊7i rs (Washington : GcorgctO\\11 Uni\'crsity Press , 1999)
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necessary for economic vital i 旬， and widespread human suffì巳 nng
Most of these events are very difficult to prepare for , especially in
the cases of poor countries experiencing poverty on .a daily basis.
That obligation to aid those countries and peoples exists seems selfevident at this point in history. Thus , when Turkey experiences a
111句 or earthquake , or when Honduras is hit by a hurricane , or when a
volcano erupts in the Philippines , governments act by providing
direct assistance or money necessary to cope with the resulting
destruction and suffering. While reactions vary in magnitude and
form , they are usually almost immediate. And , while the wealthy
countries act upon the obligation most robustly because they have
the resources to do so , the feeling of obligation is often also felt
aClltely even among the poorer countries. Indeed , while we read
editorials in the developed countries calling for faster and more
robust responses following natural disasters , it would be a rare
editorial arguing that we have no obligation to ac t. Doing so is so
beyond the pale as to be unthinkable-or at least un-sayable. The
international obligation for the wealthy to provide aid to the poorand often the not so poor-in times of natural disaster, while not a
requirement in intemational law, is almost unassailable in the
international norms ofthe modern world
While the intent here is to show the evolution of obligations of
international distributive justice over time , and to suggest that this
evolution ought to obtain in the case of HIV/AIDS , we can find
direct parallels to the HIV/ AIDS problem in each case. For example,
what does obligation to provide relief following natural disaster have
to do with HIV/AIDS? Some argue that HIV/AIDS is much like a
natural disaste r. HIV probably began in the apes and was transmitted
to humans who lived among them. It was , according to this
conception , nobody's faul t. But, as the case of disaster relief shows ,
even ifthe lV ealthy countries are not atfau缸，

obligαtion to α id exists

Famine Relief Obligation to Feed the Starving
Before the last century, when countries suffered from famine , people

in the rich countries were no doubt saddened and perhaps prayed for
the starving , but there was little they were willing to do (famine was
sometimes not far from their own doorsteps) and even less they
cOllld do (by the time aid reached those in need by sailing ship , it
would probably be too late). However, as the developed countries
began to experience food surpluses , and as technologies improved
13

for moving goods around the world , a new international obligation
developed: Those countries with a food surplus have an obligation to
35
aid those sllffering from famine. The details and degree of this
obl igation were and remain sllbject to some debate , but the basic
obligation is now almost sacrosanc t. The rich countries cannot
ignore famine and starvation , and they must act to feed those
suffering from them. (The practical solution is of course to aid them
in the long term to prevent future famines , but this obligation is not
yet highly developed.)
This new obligation to distribute food to those suffering from
famine is today visible by airlifts of food to those experiencing
famine in the developing world. But this international obligation is
so great that govemments have felt obl iged to act upon it even when
their national interests would clearly suffer from doing so. For
example , during widespread famine in the Soviet Union dllring the
early 192缸， the United States spent massive amounts of money and
expended other aid to feed the starving mi l1 ions there. This aid was
sent despite extant hatred of the new Bolshevik regime , and even
despite Lenin's acknowledgement that , without aid , the revolution
would fai l. Failure of the revolution was precisely what the United
States wanted , of COllrse, and some Americans argued that the
famine ought to be a l1 0wed to continue in order to bring down the
communist regime . But the United States acted nevertheless . Robert
McElroy has shown that U.S. jllstifications for providing famine
re1ief to Russia were not based on benefits for U.S. farmers or for
other self-interested reasons , but instead because the new obligation
to provide aid to those suffering from famine was already too strong
36
to ignore.
Similar arguments are being made today with regard to severe
food shortages in North Korea. The largest amollnt of famine aid to
North Korea一-headed by a regime that the United States hardly
wishes to see remain in power-comes from the United States
Jndeed , it would not be far fetched to arglle that the United States is
largely responsible for keeping the country a \i ve with its aid . There
are of course practical reasons for providing the aid-a sudden
S 間， for example , Jovica Patmogic , "Sorne Rcflections on Hurnanitari :m Principles
Applicablc in Relief Actions ," in Christophcr Swinarski , ed., Studies and Essays on
lnfcrnational Humanifarian Lmv (Geneva: Martinlls Nijhoff PlI blications , 1984)
36 Robcrt W. McElroy , Mοrσlity and Americσn Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton
Univcrsity Press , 1992) , pp. 57-87. Sec al so Be吋 amin M. Weissman , Hcrbert Hoover and
3S
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breakdown in North Korean society and government could spill over
into conflict on the Korean peninsula-but it is in any case
extraordinarily difficult to argue that the people of North Korea
should be allowed to starve to death as a means for bringing about
political change there , just as they did in the 1920s. 37 Such
arguments nm Up against the established international norm of
famine relie f. Hence the continuing efforts to bring down the regime
in a more humane fashion . Similarly, in Afghanistan , where the
Taliban is brutalizing the Afghan people , the United States and
others have chosen to continllC food aid , and thc United States now
even provides food aid to govemment-held parts of Sudan , despite
the government's war on its own people. Indeed , recent efforts to end
UN sanctions against Iraq are often about the suffering of the Iraq i
people. The Iraq i government is to blame, to be sure , but the
practical effects are hunger and disease in Iraq. Hence , things cannot
remain as they are , despite all arguments to the contrary. Even the
powerful advocates of keeping the sanctions on Iraq as they have
been for the last decade , despite having some very good arguments ,
are looking for new ways of punishing and containing the brutal
Iraqi regime without causing suffering among its people
To be sure , much famine and starvation is the consequence of
government action (or intentional inaction), as demonstrated
strongly by widespread famine from Mao's so-called Great Leap
Forward and , more intentionally, Pol Pot's despicable policies
toward the Cambodian people , or the policy of the current Sudanese
government toward its rebellious South. 38 And many famines are at
least an indirect conseqllence of governments' failures to prepare for
them. In thc case of HIV/AIDS , many argue that it is the fault of
their governments . They are the ones to blame , so the rich need not
feel an obl igation to provide aid. But the case of famine relief shows
that even where national governme;的 αre to blame for famine αnd
starvatlO刀， an internαtional obligation to aid those sujJering exists if
that is practicable

37 \Vhcn askcd why hc thought thc Unitcd Statcs was providing food aid to No叫1 Korca , that
COllntry's conslll-gcneral to Hong Kong , Ri To Sop , told me on 11 Jllne 2001 , "{t's
hllmanitarian" and "Bccallsc wc arc hllman beings ." Th is is a profound asscssment, given his
country's animosity toward thc Unitcd States govc口凹1cnt
3S ll lC cascs jllSt citcd arc of COllrsc cxa ll1 plcs whcrc providing aid was and is dccidedly
difficult for practical rcasons or bccausc it ran up against othcr intcrcsts dear to those who
could potcntially provide aid
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Environmental Change: COmmO l1 but Differentiαted Responsibility

The world is experiencing many environmental problems , with the
most acute effects being felt in the poorest cOllntries. 1ndeed,
environmental changes-ranging from water po Il lltion and shortages
to desertification , air polllltion and climate change一-are placing
increasing strain on developing economies , and leading to
tremendous human suffering. 1n recent decades , and particula rI y in
the last one , the wo rI d's governments have come to recognize their
responsibilities toward the environmen t. More to the point, the
developed countries have increasingly been willing to aid the poorer
countries in their efforts to combat adverse environmental changes ,
and the wealthy of the world have started to acknowledge-and act
upon-their responsibility for many ofthese problems. 39
Global warming , and resulting climatic changes , is a
particularI y salient case in poin t. Among the key principles of the
1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) was
the notion of "common but differentiated responsibility," whereby
the economicaIl y developed countries wOllld take the lead in
addressing the problem of climate change , specifically excluding
developing countries from binding limitations on emissions of the
greenhouse gases that lead to global warming. 40 The developed
cOllntries are disproportionately responsible for historical
greenhollse gas emissions , and they have the greatest capacity to
ac t. 41 Thus the Convention makes few demands on the much less
responsible and usua lI y much less capable developing countries
As a principle of international environmentallaw, common but
differentiated responsibility evolved from the notion of "common
heritage of mankind" in the UN Convention on the Law ofthe Sea,42
Scc J-brris , /nlernσ lional Eq /l ity a l1 d Glohal Environmenlal l' o !i lic.\'
FCCC, Prcamblc, A 口s . 3 and 4. For a more detailed discllssion of thc common bllt
diffcrentiated responsibility principle in this context, sce Paul G. Harris, "Common bllt
Diffcrentiated Responsibility : Thc Kyoto Protocol and United Statcs Policy ," Environmenlal
Lmv.!oll rl1σ17 ， 1 (1999) : 27-4R; and Harris丸， /，扣
nlcI
39

4('

l'ρ lilics.

See FCCC , Prcambk , \、 here the Convention notes , inler alia , that "the largest sharc of
historical and current g1oba1 emissions of greenhollse gascs has originated in deve10ped
cOllntries. "
4~ United Nations Convention on thc Law ofthe Sea , 10 December 1982 , 21 ILM 1262 (1 982)
This concept datcs to the 1950s, and was a1so integrated into the 1979 Moon Agreement
Agreement Goveming the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestia1 Bodies , 18
ILM 1434 (1 979) . See Frank Biermanr丸 "'Common Conccrn of H lI mankind': The Emergencc
of a New Concept of Intermtional Environmcnta1 Law ," Archiv des Volkerrechts 34, 4
(Dcccmber 1996), pp .4 26-481
41
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as well as the intemational designation of certain areas (Antarctica
and the deep seabed) and resollrces (e.g. , whales) 的花ommon
interests" of hllmankind.4J The UN General Assembly went further
by recognizing the earth's climate system as a "common concern" of
humankind , indicating a "certain higher status inasmuch as it
emphasizes the potential dangers underlying the problem of global
warming and ozone depletion [and implying] that international
governance regarding those 'concerns' is not only necessary or
desired bllt rather essential for the sllrvival of humankind. 4-l
Bcaring in mind that the climate is of such crucial "common
concem" to humankind , it follows that there is a responsibility on the
part of countries to protect it. This begs the question of who is
responsible. The answer derives from each country's historical
responsibility for atmospheric pollution , its level of economic
development, and its capability to ac t. This was suggested by
Principle 23 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, which stated that it
is essential to consider "the extent of the applicability of standards
which are valid for the most advanced countries but which may be
inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost for developing
countries." 的 The principle of common but differentiated
responsibi 1i ty is described succinctly in Principle 7 of the 1992 Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development
,,

States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to
conserve , protect and restore the health and integrity of the
Earth's ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to
global environmental degradation , States have common bllt
differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the
intemational pursllit of sustainable development in view of the

~3C f. Pn.:amblcs ofthc 1959 Antarctic Trcaty (402 UNTS 71) and thc 1946 International
Convcntion on thc Rcgulation of Whaling (1 61 UNTS 72) , and thc UN Gcneral Assembly

Rcsolution on thc Ql1 cstion of thc Rcscrvation Exclusively for Pcacef111 Purposcs of the ScaBcd and the Occan Floor , and thc Subsoil 111crcof, Undcrlying thc l-l igh Scas Bcyond thc
Limits of thc Prcscnt Natio n:J.1 Jurisdictions , and thc Use of thcir Rcsourccs in thc Interests of
Mankind , Rcsolution 2574 D (XXIV) of 15 Dcccmbcr 1969, reprintcd at 9 ILM 422 (1 970)
Sce Bicnn~lI1n for a morc dctailcd discussion
抖 Bienmnn ， p. 431 (notc 9)
~~ Dccbration of thc Unitcd Nations Confcrcncc on thc Human Environmcnt ( Stockholm
Dcclaration) , UN Doc. Al CO NF.4 8/J 4 (1972) , Principlc 23
17

pressures their societies place on the global environment a.nd
of the technologies and financial resources they command 刊
In addition to the FCCC , this principle was implicit in the 198~
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer ,'"
and it \V as recognized in other important intemational
undertakings. 48
All countries could suffer from climate change , although the
poor countries of the \V orld "Y ill suffer most due to their vulnerable
geographies and economies.' What is more , it is the economically
developed countries ofthe global North that have generated the most
greenhouse gases since the advent of the Industrial Revolution , and
they have thereby benefited from using the global atmosphere as _~
sink for the harmful byproducts of their economic developmen t.
During the negotiations for the FCCC , developing countries were
unified in emphasizing the historical responsibility of developed
countries for c1 imate change. They agreed to participate in the
c1 imate negotiations only on the condition that they not be required
to accept any substantial commitments oftheir own .51
The first basic principle of the FCCC states that "The Parties
should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and
t:I

JV

Ri o De c\ aration on Environmcnt and Dcvelopmcr哎， United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, UN Doc. NCONF. I 51151Rev. 1 (1992) , Principle 7
47 Montrcal Protocol on Substances that Dep Ie te the Ozonc Lay汀， 16 Septe ll1 ber 1997 , 26
ILM 1550 (1987)
4~ The principle of common but differentiated responsìbìlìty was acknowlcdgcd by , in/er alia ,
the UN General Assembly (see GA Rcsolution 44/228 [1989]), and several climate related
mcctings , in cI uding: the Second \V orI d Climatc Conferenc巴， mectings of the Preparatory
Committcc of thc United Nations Confcrcnce on Environment and Dcvelopmer哎 ， the Toronto
Confcrencc Statcmer況， the Haguc Dec Ia ration , and thc Noordwìjk Dec Ia ration . Sce Philippe
Sands , "Thc 'Grccnir頃， of lntcmational Law: Emcrging Princip Ics and Rules ," Global Legal
SI /l dies .Jollrnσ 1 1, 2 (Spring 1994)
叫 Robcrt T. Watson , Manlfa C Zinyo\\'cra and Richard H. Moss , cds ., Clin的 Ic Changc 1 夕的
fmpσc/s\ Adapfa/ions and 九1ifigafion of Climafe Chσ nge (Cambridge : Cambridge University
Press , 1996); IPCC Working Group 11 , "Summary for Policymakers , Climatc Change 2001
Impacts , Adaptation , and Vulnerability" (Gcneva : IPCC Working Group 11 ，的 Fcbruary 2001
draft); World Hcalth Organization , Climafc Changc and Hllman Hcalth (Gcncva . Wo rJ d
Hcalth Organization Ofticc of Global Integratcd Environmcntal Health , 1996);
Intergovemmental Panel on Climate Change , "甘1e Regional Impacts of Climatc Change: An
Summary for
Policymakers
(1997) ,
<h前p ﹒//
Assessment of Vulnerability,"
46

1叭叭v . usgcrp.govlipcc/html/RISPM . html> .

Clive Ponting , A Green HislOry of /he World 們 cw York: S t. Marti 的 Press ， 1991) ,
espccia Jl y pp. 387-92 and 405-6
51 Dclphine Boriorie and Jean 刊戶口 "E:x巴 rcising Common but Differentiated Responsibility ,"
in Irving M. Mintzcr and J. A. Leomrd , cds. , N egofiafing Climafc Change (Cambridge
Cambridgc Univcrsity Press , 1994) , pp . 83-84

50
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future generations of humankind , on the basis of equity and in
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties
should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse
effects thereo f. ,, 52 Thus the FCCC recognizes that all countries are
responsible for climate change , and all should endeavor to limit the
pollution that causes it. However, following the common but
differentiated responsibility principle, the treaty does not require
developing countries to reduce their greenhouse gases. It would be
unfair to expect poor countries to limit their economic development
when the wealthy countries of the world are most responsible for
present concentrations of atmospheric greenhouse gases-and the
expected consequences of this pollution for the global climate in the
next century.53 The common but differentiated responsibility
principle was reaffirmed in 1995 in the "Berlin Mandate ," whereby
developed countries pledged to act first to reduce their greenhouse
gas emlSSlons before req Ul rmg developing countries to do SO. 5-l
Subsequent negotiations regarding climate change , such as those
leading to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol , have been premised on the
common but differentiated responsibility principle. The United
States and other developed country parties to the FCCC accepted
this standard (the new Bush administration's disturbing policies
notwithstanding) because they knew developing countries would
not-and in many cases could not一Ii mit their greenhouse gas
emissions and cope with climate change otherwise. 55
The climate change regime is perhaps the most visible
manifestation that the principle of common but differentiated
responsibility has been established in intemational environmental
instruments negotiated over the last few decades. It is recognition
that all countries are responsible for limiting damage to common
FCCC , Art. 3(1)
On thc notions of faimess and eqllity in thc context of climate change and other
intemationaI environmentaI iss lI es see , for cxample , hmcs P. Bruce, Hoesllng Lee, and Erik F
Haites, cds., Climσ te Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions (Cambridge
Ca ll1 bridgc Univcrsity Press , 1996), chapter 3; Ri chard Samson Odi 月 o et al., eds., Eqllity
σnd Social Considerations Related to Climσte Change (N airobi: ICIPE Science Press , 1994);
PallI G. Harris , "Affluence, Poverty, and Ecology: Obligation , lnternational Relations , and
Sustainable Development ," Ethics and the Environment 2, 2 (1 997): 12 日 8 ; and Paul G
Harris , "Environment , History and lnternational Justice ," .!ollrnal ollnternafional Stlldies 40
(J uly 1997): 1-33
5 Berlin Mandate, 6 JlI ne 1995 , UN Doc. FCCC/CPII 995 /7 /Add.1
的 C f. Group of Seven lndllstriaIi zcd COllntrics (G-7) and Russia , "Final Commllniqué of the
Dcn\'cr Summit ofthe Eight ," Denver, 22 Ju1y 1997, paras. 14-17
5~

53

.l
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global environmental areas , with the important qualification that the
developed industriaIi zed countries should take on much greater
responsibility in preventing and mitigating global po lI ution , and
indeed in helping developing countries in their own efforts to protect
the global commons. 56 Common but differentiated responsibility has
moved from being a 芯 oft" intemational legal principle to a nascent
but increasingly robust component of intemationallaw and practice.
To be sure , environmental cases differ from those of disaster
and famine for many reasons , but they are particularly different
because, in many cases, the wealthy countries clearly contribute to
the problems and therefore share blame for them. This increases the
IeveI of intemational obligation to distribute the means to address
adverse environmental changes and their consequences. As such , the
case for aid in many environmental issue areas is even stronger than
that for disaster and famine relie f. Wh at comes from this is that
common problems require common action , but those countr戶寸切
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HIV and AIDS: 、iVill the Moral Progress Continue?
The historical evolution of obligation toward actualizing
intemational distributive justice shows that in a civilized world, the
wealthy have an obligation to help those in need. This argument
gains strength as the responsibility for problems grows-although ,
importantly, responsibility is clearly not a requirement before
obligation exists. Thus a strong case for aid from the global rich to
the global poor has a solid foundation not only in the c。中 us of
ethical reasoning, but also in intemational practice, as shown by,
among other issues , the cases of disaster relief, famine aid , and
environmental change.
\Vi lI the response of the wo rI d's wealthy countries toward
HIV/AIDS in the developing world follow the historical trend of
increasing obligation of rich to poor? There are indications that it is
moving in this direction , and there are many arguments , both
practical and ethical , for why it ought to. It seems to us that the
pub Ii cs of all countries , including those in the rich countries , are
pushing this historical trend forward . As UN Secretary General Kofi
56

C f. Bicmlann , pp . 432-65
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Anan has argued , global public opinion has pushed the developed
country governments to start opening their wallets to assist those
suffering from HIV/AIDS in the developing world: "there has been a
world-九vide revolt ofpublic opinion. People no longer accept that the
sick and dying , simply because they are poor, should be denied
dmgs which have transformed the lives of others who are better
off. 57 It is simply becoming too diftìcult for the wealthy countries to
resist the tide of public opinion , because the arguments for resisting
are seldom persuasive and run counter to so many good ethical
arguments , and historical precedents , for helping those worst
affected and least able to help themselves .
The (welcome) difficulty that policymakers have in resisting
this apparent tide of public opinion may come from the basic logic
of the norms of intemational obligation. An immense crisis exists ,
and those suffering from it lack the means to deal with it to any
satisfactory degree. Solutions to this crisis also exist , but many of
them (e.g. , drugs for treating AIDS , money to acquire and administer
treatment , resources for prevention programs) are possessed by the
wo r1 d's wealthier countries. Hence , according to the logic of the
historical trend toward greater intemational obligation between rich
and poor , those countries with the means to provide solutions to the
HIV/AIDS crisis , and give succor to those now suffering from it ,
have a moral obligation to ac t. Wh at is more , people in the
developed countries may bel ieve what some officials have been
saying (as happened during Clinton's tenure) about the economic and
security implications of HIV/AIDS in the poor countries for the
developed countries. As U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell argued
in a visit to plagued countries of Africa, AIDS "is more than a health
issue . This is a social issue. This is a political issue. This is an
economic issue. This in an issue ofpove口y . ，， 5日
Having said th 時 ， it is a curious characteristic of intemational
aftà irs that when states are partly or largely to blame for human
suffering beyond their borders , they are sometimes less willing to
provide aid. 九九rhen natural disasters strike , aid is often immediate.
But when human-induced problems arise , such as those associated
with globaI environmental changes , action is often slow in coming ,
,,

Kofi An:u丸 "Address to the African SlI mmit on HIV/AIDS , Tuberculosis and Other
Infectiolls Diseases," Abu戶， 26 April 2001 , ava ilablc at <http:/.八九"\vw.h ealthne t. org/
prog rams/e-drug-hm :lle-drug.200 104/msg00097.html>
SN Quoted in Karl Vick , "G cncral Po\\'cll's War: AIDS in Afric丸 " Jnternationa! H em /cl
Trih llne , 29 Nb y 200 1
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and many countries (especially the United States) make clear that
their aid is charitable and does not set any precedents. Oddly, we
seem much more willing to alleviate suffering caused by the gods
than that caused by our own indifference, incompetence or
mal feasance. 59

4. HIV/AIDS and International Obligation: An Analysis
Currently , the existence of rhetoric about the need to help poor
countries cope with the AIDS pandemic is as plentiful as the
resources in the developed world that could eventually be tapped
During a speech pledging $200 million (as opposed to the $1 billion
requested) to the new global AIDS fund called for by UN Secretary
General Anan , President George W. Bush called the global AIDS
cnsls almost beyond comprehension. 60 A few weeks later, his
Secretary of State, during his highly publicized tour of Africa,
pro c1 aimed on a visit to a Nairobi slum that it was entirely
appropriate for him to be addressing AIDS because of its extreme
impact on human society.61 This certainly marks an important
turnaround from a time in the recent past when the pandemic was
given scant attention by the developed world. Yet, ironically,
developed countries have not only been reticent to make meaningful
financial contributions to the problem , they have also actively
blocked efforts by developing country governments and activists
around the globe to provide affordable treatment options for people
in Iow-income countries
As we have pointed out above, an ethical viewpoint is emerging
that developed countries have an obligation to assist poorer countries
when certain conditions prevai l. First, a crisis exists that is causing
considerable human suffering. Additionally, the crisis must not be
solvable by the country(s) experiencing it and finally , the assisting
country(s) must be able to provide useful and substantial resources
to aid the resolution ofthe crisis. Generally speaking, the dynamic of
AIDS-related aid from rich countries , and particularly the United
States , has taken a course of attempting to deny each of these three
,,

lI

lllÏ s comcsωno su 中 risc to psychologists , \\"ho know that people do not lik巳 to admit
blame for thcir actions , even to thcmselves-and acting to aid those who one has harmed can
be vic叭'cd as a sclf-admission ofblamc and responsibility
61、 Karcn DcYoung , "U.S. Givcs AIDS Fund $200 Million Donation; Bush Vows Morc Money
for Public-Privatc Projcct," Washingloll Pω.1， 12 May 2001
61 Karl Vicl丸 "Powell Talks of AIDS in Nairobi Slum ," Washinglon Posl , 28 may 2001

59
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conditions , in three overlapping stages of policy developmen t. First
came a period of non-recognition of the devastating impact of the
AIDS pandemic-in essence , the denial of the need for a response
throllgh the denial of a problem in the first place. Second, there was
a phase of attempting to shift responsibi Ii ty to the developing
countries themselves , through a set of proposals that would place
heavier financial responsibilities on the global South and less on the
global North. FinaIl y, there has been a set of responses attempting
to abrogate responsibility through various manifestations of the
argument that the pandemic cannot be solved with aid from wealthy
countries because of cultural barriers, lack of health care
infrastrllcture and the enonnous (albeit highly in f1 ated) costs of
antiretroviral medicationíS
Denial has been , and continues to be , a characteristic response of
individllals , commllnities and countries whenever and wherever
AIDS strikes. A current extreme example of such denial is going on
in China. There officials have dealt with infection rates as high as
65% in areas of the Henan province by first ignoring the problem
and then denying travel privileges to Dr. Gao Yaoj 吟， who has been
intemationaIIy recognized for her efforts on behalf of those
infected. 62 Simila r1 y, only very recently have many African leaders
openly acknowledged the devastating impact of HIV in their own
countries , and in some cOllntries , including South Africa and
Zimbabwe , critics charge that the leadership is stiII in denia 1. Thus ,
it is perhaps not sllrpnsmg that developed countries , which also
initially responded with denial even within their own borders , should
react similarly to the AIDS-related problems of poor countries
、Nhat is more remarkable is the extent to which this is tme. In the
United States officials of the CIA lobbied interna lI y for three years ,
from 1987 to 1990 , just to get permission to produce a report that
was llltimately released in 1991. The classified document, entitled
"The Global AIDS Disaster" , predicted 45 mi l1 ion wo rI dwide
infections by 2000 and yet there was no government response , even
after portions were unclassified and released as a State Department
white paper in 1992. 63 Apathy continued during the mid-1990s
among U.S. government bureaucracies like the Center for Disease
6~ John Pomfret , "China Blocks Trip to U.S. by AIDS Award Honorce: Doctor Critical of
Blood Salcs that Spread Virus ," Washing lon Posl, 30 May, 200 1
63 Barton Ge lI m:m, "Death \V atch : Thc.Global Response to AIDS in Africa: 九N'orld Shunned

Signs of thc Corning Pbguc ,"

Washinglοn Po.汀 ， 5
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Control (CDC) and Agency for International Development (USAID).
Fear of creating unrealistic expectations and of losing budget
autonomy, as well as the conviction that development money would
be better spent on less expensive projects with proven results ,
contributed to the lack of activity. The governments of Westem
Europe were similarly unresponsive. 64 This denial was mirrored in
two other sectors of society within and among developed
countries--d omestic AIDS NGOs and multinational corporations ,
specificallY those within the pharmaceutical industry. In the latter
case , the drug companies met sporadically from 1991 to 1993 but
appeared to reach consensus only on the idea that price discounts in
the developing world would be a bad idea. Concluding that
governments had the responsibility to worry about accessibility and
distribution , that AIDS drug regimens were too complicated to be
adapted to developing countrγconditions， and that other ba叮 iers to
treatment exist in developing countries , they suspended their talks.ω
AIDS NGOs meanwhile , spent much of their time in the 1990s
focusing on how to get combination drug therapies to their own
c1 ients. Until full accessibility existed at home , they believed ,
money sent to developing countries was money that deserved to be
spend domestical1y.
As it became more and more difficult to deny the level of
catastrophe wrought by AIDS in developing countries , the developed
world began to move away from denial of the problem to a position
(sometimes explicit , sometimes implied) that it was up to the
developing world to bear the responsibility of its emerging health
CflSlS . This position has taken many forms. One form consisted of
emphasizing individual behavio r. Again , this approach had been
seen within developed countries during the early years of struggling
with AIDS , when governments often made the argument that it was
the responsibility of individuals to change behavior (that is , to quit
engaging in risk behaviors). More recently, the approach has been
used by governments in developed countries to argue that it is , again,
individual behavior or cultural norms (such as the treatment of
vulnerable women in developing countries) that results in the spread

“ Onc indicator of this Iack of responsivcness is th巳 abso\utc numbcrs in foreign aid devoted
to this prob \e m by dcve\opcd countrics. An excellcnt ana\ysis is provided by Amir Attaran
and Jcffrcy Sachs , "Dcfining and Rcfining Intcmationa\ Donor Support for Combating the
AJDS Pandcmic ," Lancet 357 , 9249 (6 January 2001) , pp. 57-6 1.
的 Barton Gcllman , "An Uncqua\ Calcu\us of Life and Death ," Washington Post , 27 Deccmber
2000
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of A1DS , and that aid from developed countries cannot change these
factors. A second approach emphasizes the role of national leaders
This line of argument has been particularly l1 seful as a responsibility
evasion tool by rich countries because it works in cases of both
strong and weak national leadership on A1DS . Th l1 s, when Ugandan
President Museveni provided strong and widely doc l1 mented
attention to his country's A1DS CflSlS (and Ugandan transmission
levels plummeted), rich countries could argue that their help was not
needed-a cO l1 ntry could tackle A1DS on its own. But with
Zimbabwe l1 nder Mugabe or，的 is more widely covered , South
Africa under Mbe划， the argument is that it is the government, not
lack of outside aid , that is keeping the developing country in
question from coping with HIV/ A1DS.
Finally, and most directly , at the international level "solutions"
have been offered that , while ostensibly aiding developing countries ,
actually place most of the costs squarely back upon them. This line
of reasoning lies behind both World Bank and U.S. Export-1mport
Bank offers of loans (not grants) to sl1 b-Saharan African countries.
1n both cases , the would-be Ioan agents expressed dismay at the
negative response from developing countries. Yet they failed to
address , or even acknowledge , the reasons behind the negative
reaction from developing countries. The objects of the Ioan offers
had turned them down for two reasons. First, the Ioans seemed an
inappropriate vehicle for aid , given the fact that these same countries
were actively campaigning for debt re Ii ef already , and that A1DS is
predicted to set back the economies of these cO l1 ntries even further in
the years ahead. Thus , if recipient countries cannot pay back loans
now, why should they expect to be able to pay them back in a future
that offers even worse economic conditions? A second weakness of
the Ioan scheme is that developing countries correctly realized that
they were not the only , or possibly even primary , benetìciaries of the
loans. Rather than being able to bl1 y dmgs at steeply redllced prices ,
as many developing countries have been aspiring to do , the loans
were designed as a means to provide AIDS treatments at retail
prices-a po 1i cy that would have pleased multinational
pharmacelltical companies but drastica Il y set back the policy goals
of developing countries
FinaIl y, we are currently experiencing the third phase (although
aspects of
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110r that dcveloping countrics could poss ibly solve these problems on
their own. Yet, rather than resulting in an acknowledgment of the
responsibilities of the first world, a third (again multifaceted)
defense has been raised-that the problem 站， in fact , insoluble. The
current argument is being voiced at a time when the context of the
debate has changed significantly since the late 1990s. Owing in very
large pa討 to the strenuous efforts of AIDS activists and NGOs
working in both the global North and South (and , in many cases , in
coordinated campaigns) , AIDS , and the demands of activists , have
achieved a high level of prominence in the mainstream media. The
Thirteenth International AIDS Conference held in Durban , South
Africa, during June 2000 made more headlines as a forum for the
demands of passionate and well-organized activists than as a
showcase of international research. UN Secretary General Kofi
Anan has pledged to address AIDS as his "personal figh t." And , in
April 2001 , 39 of world's largest drug companies were forced to
drop a suit against the South African government because of the
terrible intemational press , activists were generating against them.
The central theme of these demands has been that not only must
future cases be averted through prevention , but tlzαt current cases
mllst be ameliorated through treatl1l ent.
This demand is no longer even questioned within developed
countries , where sophisticated antiretroviral treatment has been the
standard of care since the late 1990s. Yet it is seen as widely radical
in the context of developing countries . The first and most severe
obstacle is cos t. ln the developed world , the combination of drugs
(refe叮ed to as combination therapy , the "cocktail" or antiretrovirals
[ARVs]) used to directly attack HIV replication (as opposed to
treating the opportunistic infections it causes) retails at around
$10 ,000 to $12 ,000 per yea r. And the developed world has
consistently argued that such costs are utterly impractical for
countries in the developing world where per capita incomes are
many times lower than these prices. Activists have successfully
argued , however, that the retail cost of ARVs bears little
resemblance to their actual cost of manufacture. The manufacturing
costs are many times less , an assertion that was given great
credibility when generic manufacturers , beginning with the lndian
company Cipla , offered a version of
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manufacturers of ARVs made a major announcement in May 2000
that they would offer steep price cuts to the developing countries
hardest hit byAIDS. Although the announcements have not been
followed with commensurate action , they actually helped to support
the argument put forth by activists that the branded pharmaceuticals
could , in fact , offer their products at far less cost in developing
countries. Basing their figures on the availability of much more
affordable generic drugs and/or deeply discounted (tiered) price
structures , activists began to argue that funding treatment, both for
opportunistic infections and Hl V, was possible and desirable.67
It was at this point, when documented arguments had been widely
distributed claiming that the largest obstacle to treatment is not
actual cost but political will (both from governments who do not feel
1i ke offering aid and pharmaceuticals who are worried about
intellectual property rights) that a new set of arguments on the
impossibility of treatment were launched by both the pharmaceutical
industry and the govemments of the wealthy countries. This
argument is that spending money on treatment would be futile
The futility argument is based on four premises. First, opponents
claim that ARVs could not be distributed because developing
countries lack the health care infrastructure (hospitals , clinics ,
trained personnel , etc.) to do so. Second , they claim that the
requirements for taking the drugs (rigorous dosing schedules ,
different combinations of drugs , with and without food or water, etc.)
would be too onerous for people in developing countries. A third
and reJated claim is that people in developing countries would be
unable to adhere to these requirements and that drug-resistant strains
would consequently develop. And , finally , they argue that treatment
wiII be substituted for prevention, resulting in inefficient uses of
resources and further spread of HIV. The comments of University
of Pennsylvania bioethicist Arthur Kaplan are typical

“

叭1hile

drugs are an answer to the AIDS plague in North
America and Westem Europe , they are not the solution
for Africa and many other extremely poor nations . The
reasons are simple. Drugs designed for people in more

“ Michael Waldholdz, "Makcrs of AIDS Drugs Agree to Sbsh Priccs in the 甘lird World ,"
w;σ11 Slrecl

Journal. 11 Mav 2000
The es tim~tes provided bter in this essay on the cost of financ ial assistance are predicated
on thcsc nc\V d巴vel o pme nts in d巳cre as ed drug pricing
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developed cOllntries do not work as well for people
living in countries that have no hospitals , clinics , clean
water, sewers , roads or doctors. G8
But advocates of treatment provision argue that these claims are
highly exaggerated. Wh ile no one disputes that health care
infrastructure is seriously lacking in many developing countries , they
suggest a number of counter points. First, they point to NGOs
inclllding Medicins Sans Frontieres and Oxfam with outstanding
credentials regarding delivery of services in developing countries
that have gone on record in high profile campaigns promoting
treatment and claiming that there are many lives that could be saved
immediately if drugs were available. They also argue that the
experience of Brazil sugges臼 that the provision of treatment fuels
the development of an infrastructure to deliver it
On the issues of pill burden and dosing requirements , they argue
that opponen臼 are working with outdated assumptions. To , for
example, Jesse Jackson's claims that "AIDS treatment requires 20 ,
30 or 40 pills a day"G9 they respond that a typical current effective
combination requires only three J) ills twice a day and that none
require more than 15 pills a day.70 On the related issue of drug
adherence , both the U.S. Treasury Department and USAID head
Andrew Nastios have recently argued that Africans cannot be
expected to take AIDS drugs because they do not have a westem
view of time. 71 These assertions are countered with evidence of
programs in the Ivory Coast, Brazil and Haiti. 72 While these
programs do not suggest that their clients are 100% compliant,
neither do programs that exist in the developed countries , and
proponents note , that it is hardly justifiable to argue that only rich
countries have the right to risk drug resistance. Furthermore, these

“ Arthur Kaplan, "Cheap Drugs Not Answer to African AIDS Crisis," MSNBC , 4 Apri12001 ,
available at <http://\v\\'\'、 ， msnbc . com/news/554660 . asp?cp 1= 1>
Jackson , quoted in Washington Pο衍， 26 March 2001
70 Health GAP Coalition , "M)ths vs. Reality: Distortions About AIDS Drugs and the
Developing World."
71 ll1Ïs position has prompted strong negativc reactions on thc part of AIDS activists in both
thc dcvelopcd and devcloping world. It has also bcen suggestcd that thc idca originally camc
from an cpisode of thc popular Amcrican te\cvision program “Wcst Wing" that portraycd the
fictional U.S. president attempting to broker a dcal bctween drug companies and a fictional
African leader. For more on this hypothcsis sce John Donnelly, "Some Wondcr If Life
Imitates Art in AIDS Policy," Boston Globe , 15 June 2001
72 lndividual Members ofthe Harvard Facu\ty , p. 8
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proponents argue, the vints has shown itself able and likely to
treatmen t. Given that successfu l1 y administered
ARVs decrease the amount of vinls within individuals , they also
decrease the opportunity for mutations within those individuals
Finally, treatment advocates find the claims regarding the
substitution of treatment for prevention as perhaps the most specious
of al l.
To the contrary, they argue , treatment complements
prevention. Not only does treatment offer an incentive for people to
undergo voluntary testing (an extremely important consideration
given that the vast m句 ority of the wo r1 d's HIV-positive people are
not aware of their status) , successful treatment lowers viral loads ,
making people less infective and less likely to pass the virus to their
unbom and breast-fed children. Importantly , treatment advocates
are arguing for both medicines and services to address the virus itself
and associated communicable diseases , inclllding tuberculosis and
sexuaIIy transmitted diseases , which both make individuals more
vulnerable to becoming infected with HIV and to progressing to
AIDS . Thus , treatment can prevent other illnesses as wel 1. Final1 y,
treatment, by prolonging the lives of adults , prevents the creation of
yet more orphans , an enormous consideration for countries already
reeling with the additional burden of thousands (and on the global
scale millions) of children with no source of support or care.
A vast increase in aid to developing countries to deal with their
AIDS crises would go a long way toward providing treatment and
prevention , and toward ameliorating some of the worst effects of the
cnsls. It would also be easily affordable for the developed wo r1 d
The estimates of what would be required vary. UNAIDS Director
Peter Piot originally suggested $3 billion annllally as a minimal
response to "tum the tide of the epidemic." 73 That estimate
specifically excluded the possibility of antiretroviral treatments , but
some future estimates include them in their numbers. Secretary
General Koft Anan has called for a global fund (to also include
treatment for malaria and tuberculosis) of $7 to $10 billion; the
Harvard Consensus statement estimates a need for $1 .4 bi l1 ion
initiaIIy, moving to $4.2 billion in five years; and the Global AIDS
mutateαbsent

UNAIDS Press Releasc , "UNAIDS Calls on G8 for Massi\"e Increase in Resources to Fight
AIDS ," 20 July 2000 avaibble at <http ://ww\\" .unaids .org./whatsne\vs/press/en g/
pressarcOO/gcncva200700. html >.
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Alliance calls for $15 billion. 7~ Each of these estimates usually
assume that the United States should contribute approximately 25%
of the total , with the rest coming from other developed countries ,
and in some cases , private corporations. Although aIl but the
smaIIest of these estimates would require at least a tenfold increase
in the level of assistance from developed countries , such an increase
is easily affordable. In calling for the original $3 biIIion , for
instance, UNAIDS Director Piot compared that figure to the $52
bi Il ion that U.S . citizens spend annuaIIy fighting obesity. 75
Harvard's Jeffrey Sachs often points out that for the United States to
pay its portion of the Harvard estimates it would only cost $8 per
person , or less than the cost of one movie with popcorn per year
Although the costs for the developed world would be smaII , the
costs of not acting for both the developing and the developed world
are potentialI y enormous. Despite this protracted pattem of dodging
its ob Ii gations regarding HIV/AIDS in developing countries , the
developed wo rI d has conceded rhetorica Il y that there are strong
practical reasons for helping to tum the tide of this global
catastrophe. In the United States , for instance, the Clinton
administration officiaIly pronounced the globaI pandemic a national
security threat. More broadly, AIDS in developing countries is not
only destroying individual Ii ves , it is destroying whole societies.
Thinking , for example, about the explosive growth in the orphan
population should give the wo rI d cause for alarm. There are
cu 叮ently estimated to be 12 million children orphaned by AIDS in
sub-Saharan Africa, and absent significant intervention , that number
is expected to grow to 40 million by 2010. 76 Most of these children
wiII reach adulthood without formaI education , parental role
modeling or significant ski Il s developmen t. Lacking these abi Ii ties
and attributes , how wi Il they be able to take on the work and family
responsibi Iities necessary for national stabi Ii ty? This is only one of
many ways in which AIDS is undermining the economies and civil
societies of African countries. In a forum sponsored by the Institute
for Peace , intemational researchers and intelligence experts warned
For discussion of thcsc cstimates , sce Eric Friedman and Paul Zci位， "Estimating the Costs
for an Expandcd and Comprehcnsive HIV/AIDS Response in Sub-Saharan Africa,"
Discussion Mcmorandum , 28 March 2001 , and Individual Members ofth巳 Harvard Faculty
口 Quoted in Joc Lauria , "AIDS Study Cites Dire African Necd , $3 B Rcmedy," Bos/on Globe ,
29 No\"ember 2000
76 See John Donnclly, "Suddenly a Plan to Treat AIDS in Afric丸 " Bos/on Globe , 13 February
2001

74

30

of dire consequences , including a decrease in the GDP of subSaharan countries of as much as 20% over the next two decades, and
the potential for extreme political instabi 1i ty and ethnic tension
Equally worrying , they also suggested that some of these problems
could occur in India as wel l. 77 As economies plunge and
governments fail , the developed wo r1 d will be forced to expend
resources on peacekeeping and stabi 1i zation efforts that could have
been staved off with far fewer resources , and certainly much less
human suffering, by providing assistance for the root problem of
AIDS .
5. Conclusion
The HIV/AIDS crisis presents the world with profound moral and
practical challenges. It is also one of greatest manifestations of
human suffering ever witnessed , largely because the vast majority of
those suffering directly and indirectly from HIV/AIDS live (and die)
in the world's poorest countries. Yet the response to this crisis by the
world's wealthy countries has been altogether lacking. They have at
least now acknowledged the problem , and they have started to
provide some help. However, their response remains weak and
miniscule relative to the scale of the problem , and some
governments and businesses continue to resist doing much at al l. We
have argued that this needs tφ-and ought to-change. Indeed, there
are many ethical , practical and historical justifications for developed
countries to provide far more help in preventing HIV transmission
and caring for those suffering from AIDS throughout the world , not
just at home. For many ethical reasons , it is unfair and inequitable to
deny further aid . For practical reasons , it is in the interests of
developed countries to provide greater assistance. And history shows
that our modem , civilized international society requires the world's
wealthy to aid the world's poor when they are in need and when help
can be provided. That the wo r1 d's poor are in need in this case is
undeniable , and we have shown that provision of aid is possible
Hence , we mllst concl l1 de that fllrther delay not only rllns counter to
the interests of al1 those who suffer from HIV/AIDS , as well as those
indirectly affected al1 over the world , but that it is immoral and
contradicts historical trends and well-established norms of
Reuters Health , "CiviI War Looms Unless Poor Countries Get ReIi ef From AIDS ," 8 May
200! avaibblc at <http ://\\ww.medscapc ,co m/ reuters/prof/200 1l05/05 .09/200! 050Spub lO 02
11tm!>

77

.3

1

intemational obligation. The case for denying aid is now very hard
to make; the case for doing much more is overwhelming.
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